The primary objective of rule-based fiscal legislation at the subnational level in India is to achieve debt sustainability by placing a ceiling on borrowing and the use of borrowed resources for public capital investment by phasing out deficits in the budget revenue account. This paper examines whether the application of fiscal rules has contributed to an increase in fiscal space for public capital investment spending in major Indian states. Our analysis shows that, controlling for other factors, there is a negative relationship between fiscal rules and public capital investment spending at the state level under the rule-based fiscal regime.
India is a federal country of 29 states and 7 centrally administered union territories. It has a highly decentralized federal fiscal structure in which state governments spend more than 56 percent of total public spending but their share of combined revenue is only 38 percent.
Although there are multiple channels of transfers, this gap between revenues and expenditures is met primarily through vertical transfers from the Union to the states through the statutory Finance Commission. 1 Burgeoning fiscal deficits at the subnational level were a major fiscal management issue for India during the 1990s and early 2000s. During this period, piecemeal attempts were made to bring fiscal discipline to the state level, both at the insistence of the central government and in the form of state-specific interventions by multilateral institutions (e.g., the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank).
In order to ensure fiscal discipline, the 12th Finance Commission of India (Finance Commission 2004) recommended rule-based fiscal controls at the state level. This also created a mechanism for providing performance incentive-based transfers for better fiscal management. 2 Performance incentives in the form of debt consolidation and relief were linked to reductions in state-level fiscal and revenue deficits 3 relative to the gross state domestic product (GSDP) within a rule-based fiscal framework. 4 This process of legislative control over deficits was further reinforced by the 13th Finance Commission (Finance Commission 2009) by providing separate performance incentive grants.
As per the recommendations of the 12th Finance Commission, if a state enacted a Fiscal
Responsibility Act (FRA) specifying 3 percent of GSDP as the upper bound for its fiscal deficit and eliminated its deficit in the current account of the budget (i.e., revenue deficit) within a specific time period (by 2008-09) , the state became eligible for debt rescheduling. If a particular state adhered to those targets specified in the act, a part of the state's debt to the 1 The Finance Commission is a statutory constitutional body appointed by the President of India quinquennially for the distribution of the net proceeds of taxes of the Union government between the Union and the states and establishing principles that should govern the grants in aid of the revenues of the states out of the Consolidated Fund of India. Apart from the Finance Commission, resources to the states are transferred through Planning Commission and various ministries of the Union government. Finance Commission-recommended transfer continues to be the primary channel of resource transfer to the states. 2 Prior to the recommendations of the Finance Commission in 2004, a few states introduced FRAs on their own. A few of them did it as a part of the subnational structural adjustment lending program support provided by the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank. A review is available in Rao and Chakraborty (2006) . 3 Revenue deficit is the difference between revenue receipts and revenue expenditure and fiscal deficit is the total borrowing or the aggregate resource gap in the budget. 4 Although state-specific FRAs have other commitments (such as reduction in guarantees given by the state governments, the level of contingent liabilities, and in some cases, level of debt), the incentive-based transfers from the Union government structured by the Finance Commission were linked to the reduction in revenue and fiscal deficits. Thus we primarily focus on these two indicators.
federal government would be written off. All the states in India now have adopted FRAs. The provisions included in these acts are more or less similar across states, particularly with regard to revenue and fiscal deficit reduction. As specified in the state-specific acts, states cannot borrow more than 3 percent of GSDP and are required to eliminate their revenue deficit within a specified time frame. Since the primary objective of the act is to phase out revenue deficits and to put an overall cap on borrowing, the core emphasis therefore is to improve public capital investment. Thus, if revenue deficit is zero, public capital investment will be equal to government borrowing. If there is revenue surplus, investment will be equal to borrowing plus the revenue surplus. The fixed borrowing limit of 3 percent of GSDP on the other hand is to ensure overall fiscal sustainability of subnational debt through a hard budget constraint. State-specific acts also imposed limits on government guarantees, associated contingent liabilities, and off-budget borrowing.
The main objective of this paper is to examine whether the application of a fiscal rule resulted in an increase in the fiscal space for public capital investment spending in Indian states. The focus is state-level capital spending, reflected in state budgets, although it does not include all public sector investment in a state, as data are not readily available. For aggregate public sector investment in a state, there are measurement issues regarding intra-public sector transactions and investments. It is therefore difficult to arrive at a precise estimate and these transactions are not considered in the present analysis.
Although macroeconomic stabilization is a federal government function, subnational deficit controls have implications for both macrostabilization and overall fiscal management in India, since the central government and the states are co-equal partners in public spending and both the levels of governments have large fiscal imbalances. In other words, fiscal and macroeconomic stability in a large federation like India depends not only on the fiscal deficit of the central government but also on the states' deficits. In India, states in the pre-FRA period had a combined fiscal deficit almost equal to that of the federal government. The average state fiscal deficit was 4.5 percent of GDP during 1998-99 to 2003-04, while the central government's fiscal deficit was 5.2 percent of GDP for the same period. Since the combined state deficits are large, and given the multilevel fiscal structure, overall deficit reduction may not be fully achieved if deficits are not controlled for by each level of government. From this standpoint, this research paper adds value to understanding the complexities of macro fiscal policies in a large federal system.
FISCAL RULES: ARE THEY USEFUL?
Rules may be necessary to restrain governments that engage in discretionary policies which have a deficit bias (Buchanan and Wagner 1977) , and to promote consistency in policy commitments (Kydland and Prescott 1977) . Koptis (2001) argued for a well-designed rulebased fiscal policy for mitigating a country's susceptibility to a crisis. According to Koptis, an inconsistency between a country's fiscal stance and its exchange rate regime played an important role in the currency crises of many countries (e.g., Russia, Brazil, and Ecuador).
These crises were also due to capital outflows where foreign investors' perceptions about government solvency were an important factor. Khemani (2008) argued that in decentralized economies, the implementation of fiscal rules could be useful for incentivizing better fiscal performance by state and local governments, and thus promoting fiscal prudence. However, the incentive structure may need to be designed in such a way that local governments do not circumvent transfer conditionalities, and in doing so not follow fiscal rules. The extant empirical literature, such as Krogstrup and Walti (2008) , Feld and Kirchgssner (2006) , and
Schaltegger (2001), shows that fiscal rules have a significant impact on budget balances. A few studies carried out using US data show that the strength of the fiscal rule was directly proportional to a reduction in unexpected deficits (Poterba 1995; Alt and Lowry 1994; Alesina and Bayoumi 1996) . In the case of Canadian provinces, a few studies indicate that provincial legislation to limit deficits led to stronger budget balances, ceteris paribus (Tellier and Imbeau 2004) . The literature on the impact of fiscal rules on fiscal performance in emerging-market economics is rather scanty (Chakraborty and Dash 2013) . -Ferreti (2004) analyzed the effectiveness of fiscal rules in light of "creative accounting." Creative accounting is defined as a measure by means of which an improvement in the fiscal balance is observed without an accompanying actual improvement in the intertemporal budgetary position of the government. Using a two-period model developed by Hagen and Harden (1996) and assuming that fiscal rules are being imposed on the "measured" fiscal balance and that a penalty must be paid if creative accounting is detected, it is observed that budget transparency is inversely proportional to creative accounting.
WHY FISCAL RULES MAY NOT WORK
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Additionally, even if the costs of engaging in creative accounting are large, tighter rules may still induce creative accounting. Manasse (2007) discussed the incentive effects of budget limits. According to this study, when limits are imposed on the deficit-output ratio, governments keep the deficit just below the limit to avoid sanctions and have no incentive to practice fiscal consolidation during "good times." These rules then also indirectly have large negative effects on welfare.
Apart from rule-based fiscal controls, there have been wide-ranging international experiences with structural adjustment lending for fiscal consolidation with mixed outcomes. A World Bank (1992) review 5 observed that adjustment lending was associated with fiscal deficit reduction and an increase in revenue, but the general spending cuts were often at the expense of critically important operation and maintenance and there was too much spending on salaries relative to non-salary inputs. Mavrotas and Quattara (2003) , while analyzing the effect of development assistance on public sector behavior, observed that official development assistance (as measured by the OECD) reduced revenues in the short run but raised them in the long run. The study by Gupta et al. (2003) of foreign aid in 107 countries during the period 1970 to 2000 observed that while concessional loans were associated with higher domestic revenue, mobilization grants had the opposite effect.
APPROPRIATE STRUCTURE FOR FISCAL RULES
The key goal of a fiscal rule is to achieve higher credibility for fiscal policy by reducing discretionary intervention in the conduct of macroeconomic policies. With regard to design, a fiscal rule should be well defined, transparent, focused, consistent with macroeconomic policies, simple, flexible enough to accommodate cyclical fluctuations, enforceable, and supported by efficient policies (Kopits and Symansky 1998) . It has been argued that a fiscal rule indicator needs to be operationally simple, flexible, growth oriented, and easily monitored.
In the case of decentralized economies, two approaches are generally adopted: an autonomous approach and a coordinated approach. In the case of a coordinated approach, all subnational governments are subject to the same rule. In the case of India, the fiscal rule as 5 Cited in World Bank (2005) imposed is also simple and has been applied with uniform deficit reduction targets across states. The European Union and emerging economies focused on targets that are numerical and uniform across countries (the autonomous approach).
A key component of the design of fiscal rules is ensuring their sustainability and deciding on an optimal level of fiscal rule indicators. The literature on sustainable fiscal rules has evolved since the 1990s, when rules were considered to be appropriate if they respected the intertemporal budget constraint. Spaventa (1987) finds that a design where the sustainability of a fiscal rule is based on the satisfaction of the budget constraint does not take into account the financial situation of the public sector. Using a sovereign debt framework (which assumes that the government cannot choose the duration of its debt), Hatchondo, Martinez, and Roch (2012) show that implementing a debt ceiling may prove beneficial for the government, as an expectation of a lower debt level would lead to a decline in interest rates. They also find that lower debt ceilings lead to less responsiveness in the interest rate to income shocks, and consumption becomes less volatile as fiscal policy becomes less procyclical. Pappa and Vassilatos (2007) and Poplawski Ribeiro, Beetsma, and Schabert (2008) find that debt ceilings may be better indicators than a ceiling on the government's deficit.
A more recent framework by Bertelsmann (2013) supports the establishment of independent fiscal institutions (IFIs) as an important component of ensuring that the fiscal rules are adhered to and that the mechanism includes design factors to ensure strong monitoring and evaluation of rules on a continuous basis. These IFIs could exercise an advisory role, report the true magnitude of government liabilities, and project the long-term implications of fiscal policy and new fiscal policy announcements. Arguments in favor of IFIs include the following: better transparency in public finances; at a more sophisticated level, an IFI can also undertake the task of monitoring and ensuring compliance with a fiscal rule, as well as include sanctions for nonobservance of a debt ceiling; and finally, IFIs can also encourage and assist governments with publishing public finance data at regular intervals and placing these data in the public domain.
SUBNATIONAL FISCAL RULES IN INDIA
In India, at the instance of the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, fiscal rules were introduced by a few states prior to the recommendations of the 12th Finance
Commission. This was done through multilateral structural adjustment lending to the states by these banks (Rao and Chakraborty 2007 6 The incentive structure of the FRA proposed by the 12th
Finance Commission is the following:
[E]ach state should enact fiscal responsibility legislation. This has been stipulated as a precondition for availing the debtrelief scheme. This legislation should, at a minimum, provide for (a) eliminating revenue deficit by 2008-09; (b) reducing fiscal deficit to 3 percent of GSDP or its equivalent defined as ratio of interest payment to revenue receipts; (c) bringing out annual reduction targets of revenue and fiscal deficits; (d) bringing out annual statement giving prospects for the state economy and related fiscal strategy; (e) bringing out special statements along with the budget giving in detail number of employees in government, public sector, and aided institutions and related salaries.
To avail themselves of the debt consolidation and relief facility under the act, all the states Finance Commission. 7 The 13th Finance Commission also proposed an incentive framework to ensure that the states remain within the FRA deficit targets. There was some apprehension that maintaining fiscal prudence post-global financial crisis would be a challenging task.
As As assessed by the 13th Finance Commission, the proposed fiscal consolidation path was growth promoting, as it focused on the elimination of the revenue deficit to ensure that net public borrowing was exclusively used for growth-enhancing public investment. Finance Commission, the main reason behind this fiscal correction was the benefit of higher shares of federal taxes due to the high federal tax growth and improvement in state tax revenues. State debt-to-GSDP was also reduced sharply during this period to below 30 percent of GDP. However, there were wide variations in fiscal performance among the states (an issue we discuss later). In order to continue to strengthen the process of fiscal 7 As per the Indian Constitution, the Finance Commission is a temporary body appointed quinquennially to recommend devolution of taxes and grants to the states for five years. 8 The Commission recognized that states were permitted to borrow more than the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act (FRBMA) targets in 2008-09 and 2009-10 . This specific relaxation of targets for two years was a part of the fiscal stimulus package announced by the central government to increase government spending to contain the adverse impact of the global financial crisis. Due to this relaxation of target, the Commission allowed one year (i.e., 2010-11) as a year of adjustment and recommended fiscal consolidation from 2011 -12 (Finance Commission 2009 consolidation at the state level, the 13th Finance Commission made the following recommendations:
The Medium Term Fiscal Plan should make explicit the values of the parameters underlying expenditure and revenue projections and the band within which these parameters can vary while remaining consistent with FRBMA targets.
The FRBMA should specify the nature of shocks which would be required before any relaxation of FRBMA targets.
States should amend/enact their FRBMAs to build in the fiscal reform adopted by the state. State-specific grants recommended for a state should be released upon compliance with fiscal reform goals. (Finance Commission 2010: 6)
KEY FISCAL INDICATORS: THE LONG-RUN TREND
In 1991, a large combined fiscal deficit on the order of 9.9 percent of GDP (i.e., the Union's fiscal deficit of 6.6 percent and combined state deficit of 3.19 percent) and a huge external current account deficit, coupled with dwindling foreign exchange reserves, are considered to be the factors that contributed to the macroeconomic crisis and the subsequent economic reforms in India. One key component of the big-bang economic reform was fiscal consolidation. Fiscal reform was a combination of tax reforms, expenditure control, and reforms in the management of public debt. We will discuss these very briefly.
As part of the fiscal reform, a major tax reform initiative was undertaken to overhaul the country's complex tax system. Simplification and moderation in the tax rate and modernization of the tax administration system were the main components of tax reform. The peak rate of personal income tax was reduced from 50 percent in 1991 to 30 percent in 1997-98. 9 The reform of indirect taxes was comprised of a reduction in the customs tariffs and the Union excise duty structure. A sharp rate reduction in indirect taxes contributed to the decline in indirect tax revenue during the 1990s, but direct tax revenue had shown commendable growth during this period. As the share of indirect taxes was much higher than direct taxes, the increase in the direct tax could not offset the revenue loss from indirect taxes. 9 Currently India has one of the lowest income tax rates in the world.
As revenues were not rising, in the initial years of economic reform fiscal consolidation was achieved by reducing discretionary development spending through reducing capital expenditure for public investment. However, the success achieved in containing the deficit 2008-09 and 2014-15 (budget estimates). However, differences were observed in the interstate fiscal imbalance profile. Though the rate of increase of deficits varied across states, 11 It is observed that the decline in the interest burden in the last couple of years is due to the softening of interest rates on government securities. It is also argued that measures, such as debt swap schemes in a lowinterest regime, have benefited the states in reducing the interest burden. 10, 5.11, and 5.12. 12 As is evident, most states overadjusted their fiscal deficits. Our data analysis also suggests that low-income states have adjusted their deficits more compared to high-and middle-income states. In other words, these states have borrowed less than the prescribed limit of borrowing under the FRAs, with exceptions in a few states (e.g., Kerala, Punjab, and West Bengal) . These three states had to borrow to finance the deficits in their revenue accounts. 12 Special category states are the states in north east India and other hilly states in the northern part of India with special federal fund dispensation due to their higher fiscal and cost disabilities. Our state-specific descriptive analysis of fiscal balances also suggests that the overall statelevel fiscal balance has improved with the introduction of a fiscal rule. However, statespecific fiscal imbalances are different across states, especially with regard to revenue deficits. A few states continued to have deficits in their revenue accounts, implying borrowed resources were being used for financing revenue or current expenditure. On the other hand if we consider fiscal deficits, most states remained within the prescribed 3 percent FRA target.
This descriptive analysis does not conclusively establish the exact impact of a fiscal rule on fiscal balances, the way state-level fiscal consolidation has been achieved, or the nature of the relationship between different state-level macro and fiscal variables. One needs to control for such factors to examine the impact of a fiscal rule on fiscal balances and spending. The descriptive analysis also does not help in understanding the process of fiscal adjustment in a rule-based fiscal control regime across states. Due to multiple factors, panel data analysis, which is well suited to the studies that deal with dynamic changes, is used to address these issues. Our analysis used a dataset of 14 major non-special category states 13 
THE ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION
The final model has been defined to include two different determinants (per capita gross state domestic product and per capita central government transfer) and two different dummies (VAT and FRA), with the FRA dummy being the most important variable of interest.
Econometrically, the model can be specified as follows: Our analysis shows that the lag of per capita capital outlay, per capita transfer (igft), and per capita gross state domestic product (gpc) have a positive and significant impact on an increase in per capita capital outlay, and the VAT dummy also has a positive and significant effect on per capita capital outlay. However, we observed a negative relationship between the FRA dummy and the capital outlay at the state level.
SPENDING INERTIA
This result is not surprising. We would like to emphasize that states in the post-FRBMA period are extremely cautious in spending, as reflected in their overcorrection of deficits. This has, in turn, depressed capital spending in the states. This spending inertia has also contributed to a large accumulation of cash surplus holdings by states. The Reserve Bank of India's "Study on State Finances: 2011-12" observed that:
The surplus cash balances of the states stood at Rs. 852 billion as on March 11, 2012 . These cash balances get automatically invested in the central government's 14-day intermediate treasury bills as well as in auction treasury bills (ATBs) where states are non-competitive bidders, without any ceilings/ limits. Consequently, there is a spillover of the surplus position of the states to the liquidity position of the Centre. The build-up (and volatility) of the central government's cash surplus, in turn, reflects the unintended absorption of liquidity from the banking system which poses a challenge to the reserve bank's monetary management.
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The same study also pointed out that in its report submitted in fiscal year 2009-10, the 13th
Finance Commission "advised the state governments to first utilize their cash balances before taking recourse to fresh borrowings, to finance their deficits so as to reduce the interest burden." 16 However, in practice, this did not happen. Specified a series of annual deficits targets with a balanced budget to be achieved in 1991 and subsequently moved to 1993.
CONCLUSIONS
APPENDIX
Annual appropriations limit adopted for discretionary spending.
Deficit-raising policies must be financed by other measures over a specified time period. Exempt programs included legislation with an "emergency" designation, Social Security, and the Bush tax cuts for the middle class. Country-specific medium-term objectives are set for structural budget balance.
Annual pace of debt reduction (no less than 1/20th of the distance between the actual debt ratio and the 60 percent threshold) starting three years after a country has left the current excessive debt procedure (EDP). New limit of 2 percent for balanced budget was set. Real growth of current expenditure limit was at 4 percent, structural deficit limit at 1 percent of GDP.
Expenditure on maintenance of infrastructure, goods, and services of social programs covered by the performance-based budgeting scheme; equipment intended for public order and security were excluded from current expenditure and were out of the ambit of the stipulated limits. The government needs to run operating surpluses annually until "prudent" debt levels are achieved. Once these are achieved on average total operating balances should not exceed total operating revenues. In case of deviations from the principles, the government needs to specify the reasons; specific fiscal targets should be set by the government for three-year and ten-year objectives, typically in percent of GDP. The rule sets a ceiling on expenditures (oil revenue at the "base" oil price, plus all non-oil revenues, plus a net borrowing limit of 1 percent of GDP). Once the reserve fund reaches this threshold, at least half of excess oil revenues should go to the National Wealth Fund, while the remaining resources would be channeled to the budget to finance infrastructure and other priority projects. Budget to be balanced across government term of office (usually 5 years).
The rule was amended in 2008 to change the benchmark to "expected long-term net real investment returns." 
